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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff sued the Defendants in fraud and seeking to
specifically enforce the sale of a home at 275 Gemini Drive, Salt
Lake City, Utah, based upon the first of two "Earnest Money
Receipt and Offer to Purchase" documents entered into between the
parties. (R-2-8) The first document was in an amount of $7,850.00
less than the second; Plaintiffs purchased the said home based
upon the second document, then sued for the difference between
the purchase prices.

Third District Judge Jay E. Banks granted

judgment for the Plaintiffs for fraud and in the amount of
71,850.00 together with $1,500.00 attorney fees and interest.
(R-65)

Defendants filed a Motion for a New Trial under Rule

60(b) U.R.C.P. Subsections 1, 2, 6 & 7. (R-82-83)

The Court

denied this Motion.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.

Did the first Earnest Money Deposit and Offer to

Purchase constitute a valid contract between the parties?
II.

Were the additions placed on the said document

sufficient to constitute a Counteroffer?
III.

Was it fraud for Defendant-Appellant to sign the

document individually and list it individually?
IV.

Did the Plaintiffs-Respondents perform their

obligations under the contract?

V.

Did the Defendant-Appellant breach the terms of the

first Earnest Money Deposit and Offer to Purchase?
VI.

Were any other of the actions of the Defendant-

Appellant fraudulent?
VII.

Is the Judgment as issued more than prayed for

and not supported by the findings or evidence of damages?
VIII.

Has the Defendant-Appellant met the requirements

of Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for the
following:
A. Upon motion and upon such terms as are justf the
Court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his
legal representative from a final judgmentf order or proceeding/
for the following reasons:
Subsection 1.
excusable neglect;

Mistake inadvertance, surprise, or

Subsection 2. Newly discovered evidence, which
by due diligence could not have been discovered in time
to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b):
Subsection 6. . . . or it is no longer equitable
that the judgment should have prospective application;
Subsection 7. . . . any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment . . .
IX.

Was it error for the Third District Court to award

damages to the Respondents when the newly discovered evidence
showed that the present value of the second Offer to Purchase,
was in fact less expensive than the present value of the first
Offer to Purchase which the Plaintiffs were seeking to
specifically enforce?
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about April 22, 1977, the Plaintiffs-Respondents made
an offer, through an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase,
to purchase certain property owned by Defendant-Appellant,
consisting of a lot and an unfinished home located at 275 Gemini
Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah. (Exhibit 1-P)
The Defendant Myrna E. Marsden had removed herself from the
case by filing for bankruptcy and the Trial Court so found. (R66)

Defendant-Appellant had previously listed the property for

sale with Century 21.

Richard D. Lauritzen, a real estate

salesman, who had had prior dealings with Defendant-Appellant on
the same and other properties obtained the offer. (R-l-4)
The offer contained the following terms and conditions:
1.

Purchase price was to be $31,350.00 with $100.00 as

Earnest Money, and Purchaser to apply for a $29,000.00
loan.

The document does not state how the difference of

$2,250.00 is to be paid.
2.

The offer was subject to Purchasers obtaining

financing.
3.

Seller was given three (3) days to make written

acceptance.
4.

There was no description of what they were offering

to buy or its current state of completion or what state of
-3-

completion it was to be in by June 1, 1977, which was the
possession date.
5.

No names were given with respect to whom the

property was to be conveyed.
6.

Items to go with the sale if currently attached to

the premises were as follows:
i.

Plumbing and heating fixtures and

equipment;
ii.

Water heaters and burners;

iii.

Electric light fixtures, excluding bulbs;

iv.

Bathroom fixtures, roller shades, curtain

rods and fixtures, Venetian blinds, window and door
screens, linoleum, all shrubs and trees and any other
fixtures. (Exhibit 15-P)
Defendant-Appellant did not accept the offer within the 3
day period; but made a counter-offer on April 26, 1977 imposing
certain conditions on the purchasers. (Exhibit 1-P)

Purchasers

did not meet the conditions of the counter-offer within the time
limit specified. (R-250; 255-257)
Approximately ten months after entering the second Earnest
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase dated June 6, 1978, (Exhibit
3-P) the Plaintiffs-Respondents commenced suit to specifically
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enforce the firstf together with damages, both general and
punative, attorney's fees and costs. (R-2-8)
Prior to the trial in this litigation, which was in the
Third District Court, under Civil No. C-79-2873, the Defendant
had tried earnestly and persistently to obtain from Utah Mortgage
Loan Corporation and the Federal Housing Administration information concerning the loan applications of the PlaintiffsRespondents, which formed the basis of the Plaintiffs-Respondents1
claims against the Defendant-Appellant. (R-96-98)

These attempts

were made through personal visits to the respective offices and
through phone calls to the offices of the respective agencies.
(R-96-98)
Prior to the trial, the Defendant-Appellant herein had
consistently and persistently been told by the respective loaning
agencies that the files concerning the Plaintiff-Respondent had
been destroyed and were not available.

This information was

conveyed to the Defendant-Appellant's attorney of record, and
both the attorney and the Defendant-Appellant relied upon the
statements of the respective loaning agencies that the files had
been destroyed and that the information contained in them was not
available. (R-96-98; R-475)
After the trial, the Third District Court, the Honorable
Judge Jay E. Banks presiding entered a Judgment for the
-5-

Plaintiffs-Respondents and against the Defendant-Appellant
essentially for the difference between the two offers in the
amount of $7,850.00 plus $1,500.00 in attorneys fees and
interest, on the 3rd day of June, 1980. (R-65) This matter is
currently on appeal before this Court, based on a Notice of
Appeal filed on July 2, 1980, under file #17174. (R-85-86)

On or

about the 23rd of June, 1980, the Defendant-Appellant was advised
by Utah Mortgage Loan Corporation that the PlaintiffsRespondents1 file had been discovered and was not in fact
destroyed. (R-475;96-98)

Defendant-Appellant obtained a copy of

said file from the same and found the following facts: (R-96-98;
473; 474; 476; 477)
1.

Plaintiff made application to Utah Mortgage Loan

Corporation on April 25, 1977, for a $29,000.00 loan at 8
percent interest per annum for 30 years.
2.

Said loan to be secured by a lien on 275 Gemini

Drive.
3.

The application was made for the purpose of

obtaining FHA Section 203(b) insured loan.
4.

This loan was not used by plaintiffs since they had

made down payment on another property.
5.

After cancellation of the Plaintiffs-Respondents

initial loan under the first Offer to Purchase, the
-6-

Respondents made an application for a loan from American
Home Morgage and/or Medal ion Corporation Mortgage Company
which was an FHA 235 subsidized loanf using one of Marsden's
Corporations (Defendants' Corporation) reservations
therefor, thus reducing the interest rate on the second loan
to 4 percent.

This effectively made the present value of

the second loan which the Respondents accepted and through
which they purchased the property, better than the present
value of the first loanf which they rejected even through
the total purchase price was greater.

The first loan

carried an interest rate of 8 percent,
6.

In effect by accepting the second/ loan, Plaintiffs

obtained a less expensive loan and were not damaged in
making that election even though the total purchase price
was greater.
Upon receipt of the file from Utah Mortgage Loan
Corporation, the Appellant made application to the Third
District Court under Rule 60(b) under the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, for a new trial.

(R-82-83) This motion was

made in a timely manner, was heard by the Honorable Jay E.
Banks, and was denied and said denial was entered on August
2, 1985. (R-461-462)
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A timely Notice of Appeal was made by the Appellants on
September 3, 1985f (R-463-464) and a Motion to Consolidate this
Appeal with #17174 has been granted by this Court.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A contract is not formed when prospective purchasers make an
offer with a 3-day deadline which Seller did not meet.

In

addition, when the conditions of the otter are not met and the
Seller puts added conditions onto the offer, it then becomes a
counteroffer and the Court may not exclude certain conditions and
enforce others so as to form a contract that the parties to the
contract did not intend, and then specifically enforce it.
Fraud is not performed where a seller merely admits to
include his wife's name on the earnest money offer and then
obtains the wife's signature on the closing documents.

To

establish fraud, damages directly relating to the fraud must be
estabished.
What is the measure of damages and how can a Court measure
them when there is little or no evidence concerning them?
damages be proved?

Must

What weight should the Court place on the

newly-discovered evidence and did the Defendant-Appellant come
within the perview of Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P. so as to be given a new
trial to establish the evidence?
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ARGUMENT
POINT I:

DID THE FIRST EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT AND OFFER TO
PURCHASE CONSTITUTE A VALID CONTRACT BETWEEN THE
PARTIES.

There is no doubt from the record that the Plaintiffs, in
combination with Mr. Lauritzen, drew up and offered to purchase
the lot and home located at 275 Gemini Drive, Salt Lake City, (R243).

The terms and conditions of the offer are spelled out on

exhibit 15-P.

However, on exhibit 15-P the lines where the

Defendant as Seller should have signed are empty.

He never

accepted the offer within the 3-day period specified on exhibit
15-P.

These lines were in fact never signed by Defendant on any

ot the multiple Earnest Money Offers that were made.

Marsden

never in fact accepted the various offers of Gerrards' without
adding conditions (1-P; 3-P; 13-D & 14-D).

Exhibit 1-P was

changed by Marsden and a counteroffer was made.

Among the terms

and conditions imposed in the counteroffer were (1) Required that
$2,250.00 be paid to Utah Management; (2) Tentative Approval by
Loan Company had to be within seven days (by May 3, 1977); (3)
Approval had to be in writing; and (4) Time is of the essence.
That the Gerrards did not meet the burden of these
conditions is clear from the record.

Lauritzen testified that he

knew that the loan had not been tentatively approved by May 3 (R256) and that the Gerrards did not tender the purchase price
-9-

within the designated time period. (R-257)
themselves admitted the same (R-310).

The Gerrards

Therefore, while the

Gerrards claimed to have accepted the conditions imposed by
Marsden (R-262) they were not able to perform.

Lauritzen

testified that the written signatures of acceptance were even in
doubt and were not signed until nine months after the counteroffer by Marsden

(R-255).

That this acceptance came too late is

obvious from the terms contained on Exhibit 1-P.

How can time be

of the essence it the acceptance comes 9 months later.

It

follows then that in the first instance there was no timely
acceptance of the counteroffer, and secondly if it is conceivable
that there was, there was no timely performance therefore no
binding agreement between the parties.

This Court held in

Ephriam Theatre Co. v. Hawk, 321 P.2d 221, 7 Utah 2d 163.
The purpose of contract is to reduce to writing the
conditions upon which the minds of the parties have met
and to fix their rights and duties in respect thereto,
and intent so expressed is to be found, if possible,
within the four corners of instrument itself in
accordance with ordinary accepted meaning of words
used. (at page 223 of P.2d)
Appellant submits that there was no timely meeting of the
minds between the parties to the contract found on Exhibit 1-P.
In keeping with this meeting of the minds requirement is the
case of Jensen v. Bouwhuis, 577 P.2d 55 (Utah 1978).

There this

Court held, in a case very similar to the case at bar, involving
-10-

the specific performance of an Earnest Money and Offer to
Purchase Agreement which had a deadline of March 1, 1976.
The purchaser never offered to buy the entire tract of
land until months after the seller had renounced the
deal. There never was a valid contract made andf
therefore, no specific performance could be decreed,
(at page 559)
In the instant case, Marsden testified that he repudiated
the offer on several different occasions.

Firstly, there was a

repudiation in fact because Marsden never received Exhibit 1-P
signed and returned to him or Lauritzen within the 3-day time
period (R-378).

Secondly, on the 26th of April, 1977, he told

Gerrards that it was repudiated (R-373-374; 402; 406; 407) if
they did not act.

This together with the fact that Gerrards

never signed and accepted the counteroffer until the Spring of
1978 (R-37 3) and even submitted it to the loan company without
signing it (R-408) indicates a non-agreement, a failure of the
meeting of the minds and a repudication of the counteroffer.
Especially if the term "time is of the essence" is to mean
anything.
By specifically enforcing exhibit 1-P the trial court is in
effect re-negotiating the sale of the home between the parties.
That this should not be done is clear from Carlson v. Hamilton,
332 P.2d 989, 8 Utah 2d 272, where this Court stated
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It is not the function of the Court to renegotiate a
contract of the parties.
Or for that matter "even if the contract is a bad bargain,"
Carlson, supra.

And even if the "contract is ill advised and

burdensome, court cannot make a new contract for the parties."
Tooele City v. Settlement Canyon Irr. Co., 291 P.2d. 881, 4 Utah
2d 215.
The Court has reiterated these principles in Bekins Bar V
Ranch v. Hath, 664 P.2d 455 (Utah 1983) when it stated:
With a few exceptions, it is still axiomatic in
contract law that "[p]ersons dealing at arm's length
are entitled to contract on their own terms without the
intervention of the courts for the purpose of relieving
one side or the other from the effects of a bad
bargain." Biesinger v. Behunin, Utah, 584 P.2d 801, 803
(1978). Parties "should be permitted to enter into
contracts that actually may be unreasonable or which
may lead to hardship on one side." Carlson v. Hamilton,
8 Utah 2d 272, 275, 332 P.2d 989, 991 (1958). Although
courts will not be parties to enforcing flagrantly
unjust agreements, it is not for the courts to assume
the paternalistic role of declaring that one who has
freely bound himself need not perform because the
bargain is not favorable.
In the Bekins case, supra, the plaintiff was seeking to avoid the
foreclosure on his ranch on the basis that among other things
interest rates charged him on loans obtained using the ranch as
collateral were unconscionable.
to his contract.

But this Court made him adhere

Appellant submits that Plaintiffs-Respondents

should be made to adhere to their contract for the purchase of
this home; to wit, exhibit 3-P.
-12-

POINT II: IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO SPECIFICALLY ENFORCE
THE FIRST EARNEST MONEY OFFER
The trial Court concluded as a matter of law that the
Gerrards were entitled to Specific Performance of the first
Earnest Money Offer to Purchase Agreement (R-78).

Yet the law of

this state on specific performance would not justify such a
conclusion.

In the Fischer v. Johnson, 525 P.2d 45 (Utah 1974)

case this Court held
In order to claim specific performance, a party must
either perform or tender performance in accordance with
the covenants in his contract.
In Fischer (supra) the matter involved, like the case on
appeal, the specific performance of an Earnest Money Agreement
signed in the expectation of the sale of the Restaurant known as
the "Quail Run," in Salt Lake County.

Similar to the case at

bar, the prospective purchasers, as an excuse for nonperformance
in a timely manner claimed that the sellers had made themselves
unavailable, had left town, and thus made the closing impossible.
Purchasers argued that they had made every effort to contact
sellers and were ready and willing to perform.

In dispensing

with this argument this Court held:
We appreciate the correctness of the plaintiffs'
assertion: that under usual circumstances one party to
a contract (such as defendants) cannot act designedly
to make it difficult or impossible for the other party
to perform, then invoke a defense of nonperformance.
But it is also true that specific performance is a
-13-

remedy of equity; and one who invokes it must have
clean hands in having done equity himself. That is, he
must take care to discharge his own duties under the
contract; and he cannot rely on any mere inconvenience
as an excuse tor his failure to do so. Even if
inconvenience or difficulty is encountered, he must
make an effort to perform, or to tender performance,
which manifests reasonable diligence and a bona fide
desire to keep his own promises.
1.

Cummings v. Nielsen, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619.

2. See Wimer v. Wagner, 323 Mo. 1156, 20 S. W.2d 650,
79 A.L.R. 1231; Kinberger v. Drouct, 149 La. 986, 90
So. 367; Maughlin v. Perry, 35 Md. 352; and see
annotation, 147 A.L.R. 1312.
Appellant submits that the Fischer case, supra is
controlling in this matter.
The facts in the instant case are very similar to Fischer,
supra, if this Court believes that the Gerrards in fact accepted
Marsden's counteroffer (exhibit 1-P); but failed to perform the
requirements of the counteroffer.

(R-256; R-257; R-310) and

therefore, must find themselves in the same position as the
purchasers in the Fischer case, supra, with the same result.

The

only possible difference is that in Lauritzen's opinion the
"tentative loan approval in writing" could not be obtained within
the seven day time period contained in the counteroffer (R258).

Lauritzen's expertise to claim this is not established in

the record, but Marsden claimed that based upon his business
experiance, he had obtained loans within seven days and at the
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time he wrote the conditions of the counteroffer that he thought
the Gerrards could too (R-44 3).

Further, that he needed the

assurance of the tentative acceptance by the loaning institution
so that he could expend the time and effort to get the house
ready by June 1, 1977; without which he was not prepared to move
forward (R-334).

In reverting these facts to the applicable

principles of law the Appellant agrees with this Court in the
Fischer case, supra, when it said:
There is undoubtedly a basis in the evidence to justify
a conclusion that the actions of the defendants created
some degree of difficulty or inconvenience for the
plaintiffs. Nevertheless, we cannot see therein any
basis upon which it could reasonably be concluded that
the plaintiffs discharged the duty which the law
imposes upon them of attempting with reasonable
diligence and good faith to do what the agreement
required of them. They did not fulfill that obligation
by simply serving the notice of willingness to go
forward, and yet failing to tender the required $3,000
payment.
This court has held in a number of cases that in order
to claim specific performance, a party must either
perform or tender performance, in accordance with the
covenants in his contract: See Nance v. Schoonover,
Utah, 521, P.2d 896: Sieverts v. White, 2 Utah 2d 351,
273 P.2d 974: Coombs v. Ouzounian, 24 Utah 2d 39, 465
P.2d 356.
The transcript is void of any attempts by the Gerrards to
obtain the seven day tentative loan approval, other than one
visit to the loan company with Lauritzen (R-245), and a phone
call or two thereafter. (R-264)
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If in reality they had accepted

Marsden's counteroffer, they made little or no attempt to try to
comply with it, or yet an extension.

Therefore, the Gerrards

having failed to put themselves in a position to enforce the
agreement, the judgment of the District Court should be reversed
and the case remanded.
POINT III:

IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO FIND THAT THE APPELLANT
HAD COMMITTED FRAUD BY LISTING HIMSELF AS SELLER OF
THE PROPERTY.

In its Findings of Fact (R-76) the trial court found fraud
on the part of Appellant for listing himself individually as the
seller on exhibit 1-P.

That the Appellant listed himself

individually is not contested; but does this establish fraud?

In

the landmark case of Pace v. Parrish, 247 P.2d 273, 122 Utah 141,
this court held:
Elements of actionable fraud to be proved are a false
representation of existing material fact, made
knowingly or recklessly for the purpose of inducing
reliance thereon, upon wnich plaintiff reasonably
relies to his injury.
Emphasis should be placed upon the language "Upon which
Plaintiff reasonably relies to his injury." Where is the
injury to the Gerrards by Marsden placing his name on
exhibit 1-P individually, rather than together with his
wife's?

When the time came for the actual sale of the house

based upon a meeting of the minds, Appellant had no trouble
getting his wife's signature on the proper documents to
-16-

convey title and accept the offer,

(exhibits 3-P; 10-D; 13-

D) Surely this act was simply an oversight on the part of
Marsden which caused absolutely no harm or damage whatsoever
to Respondents.

Which of the Respondents alleged damages

flow from their reliance upon the fact that Marsden had
listed himself individually as the seller?

Appellant

testified that the land had been purchased from a closely
held corporation by he and his wife (R-313).

That he had

done all of the negotiating on the transaction for his wife
(R-314) and that the Corporation would do the building (R314-315).

Therefore, since Appellant was acting for the

corporation as the builder and had negotiated the purchase
of the land for his wife, from the corporation, it was a
natural harmless error not to list his wife on 1-P, and not
the kind of error for which a finding of fraud should stand.
The evidence shows that the real problem in this case
was the mistaken belief on the part of Respondents that they
could still purchase the home according to the terms and
conditions of exhibit 1-P without themselves performing
their part.

(R-262; 264) A phone call or two was the extent

of their effort to get the loan approval required by exhibit
1-P (R-264).

-17-

Under these conditions this Court has held in the
Meagher v. Uintah Gas Co., 255 P.2d 989f 123 Utah 123,
Actionable fraud will not lie where one is induced to
change his position, not because of any practiced
deceit, but because of his own mistake.
In Meagher, supra, the Court was dealing with an owner of land
who had misread and misunderstood a legal document and the Court
refused to help him on that basis.

Appellant submits that on the

same basis the trial court should not have helped Respondents and
for the same reasons.
POINT IV: IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO FIND THAT THE APPELLANT
BY HIS ACTIONS DELAYED THE APPROVAL OF THE LOAN.
The record in this case just does not support this finding
number 12 by the trial court. (R-77)

Lauritzen testified that

Appellant got the appraisal increased (R-247).

He also testified

that the loan was delayed because the house had not been
appraised. (R-251) Whose duty it was to obtain and pay for an
appraisal the record does not show; nor do the exhibits for they
all remain silent on this subject.

The Trial Court could have

just as readily concluded that it was Plaintiff's obligation to
obtain the Appraisal as it was the defendants, especially if it
was a loan requirement.

However, Appellant sheds light on the

system and how appraisals are arrived at by explaining that the
house consisted of a basic plan and alternatives. (R-355) The
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number of alternatives in a given home determined the value of
the house.

Therefore, it is logical that before the loaning

institution would loan money on a home, they had to know how many
alternatives there were installed.

That Marsden tried to get ths

information to the Loan Institute is established by the fact he
was at Gerrard's home 2 days after March 26, to get their choice
on alternates for the home.

This logical and necessary process

is what the District Court concluded to be the delaying of the
loan approval by Appellant.

While Appellant acknowledges the

latitude allowed trial courts its findings must have competant
evidence to support them, Farrell v. Turner, 482 P.2d 117, 25
Utah 2d 351.

"Without competent evidence to support the trial

courts' findings, this Court will not hesitate to exercise its
prerogative to substitute its own judgment."

Penrose v. Penrose,

656 P.2d 1017. (Utah 1982)
POINT V:

THAT THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT BECAUSE THE
FIRST OFFER WAS LESS IN TERMS OF GROSS DOLLARS THAN
THE SECOND PLAINTIFFS HAD BEEN DAMAGED.

In its findings (R-78) the trial court concluded that
because the first offer was for $31,350.00 and the actual sale
was for $39,200.00 approximately one year later, that the
Plaintiffs were entitled to a judgment for the difference.

This

does not follow, and does not flow from the evidence produced at
trial.

According to exhibit 2-P the loan that Plaintiffs
-19-

obtained according to the statement on Exhibit 1-P was an FHA
loan for $29,000.00 at 8 percent to run for 30 years.
According to exhibit 3-P Plaintiffs were to obtain an FHA
235 loan for $38,000, but to run at only 4 percent interest and
defendant would pay all closing costs over $600.00.

It does not

take a mathematical genius to calculate that the $38,000.00 loan
at 4 percent is a much less expensive loan over the 30 year
period than the $29,000.00 loan at 8 percent.

When this was

brought to the trial courts' attention, an interesting but
erroneous conclusion was reached by the judge as follows. (R-444
& 445)
MR. DUDD: See, Judge, the thing that isn't in evidence
is the Court has no evidence presented by the
plaintiffs as to what the terms of the loans were.
Now, were they borrowing money under the first loan at
eight percent? It could pay out a lot more money if
they were borrowing under the second loan at five
percent.
THE COURT:
MR. DODD:
THE COURT:
that.

The interest didn't go down.

It went up.

You don't know that.
You've been around here long enough to know

MR. DODD: What I'm saying is damages have to be
proved. The Court cannot assume payments.
Appeallant submits that from the very same documents that
the Court concluded that the interest rates went up, they in fact
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show that they went down (Exhibit 2-P; 3-P); thus the Plaintiffs
were not damaged by buying the home under the second offer,
POINT VI: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
A NEW TRIAL
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly
allows relief from a final judgment as follows:
60(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly
Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On motion and upon such
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidenced which by due
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or
other midsconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for any
cause the summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as requied by Rule 4(e) and the
defendant has failed to appear in said action; (5) the
judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been satisfied,
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it
is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is
not longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (7) any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall
be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2),
(3), or (4), not more than three months after the judgment,
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under
this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality oif a
judgment or suspend its operation. This Rule does not limit
the power of a court to entertain an independent action to
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to
set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The
procedure for obtaining any relif from a judgment shall be
by motion as prescribed in these Rules or by an independent
action.
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Defendant filed his motion in a timely and proper manner (R82; R-471) and was supported by an affidavit of Marsden (R-9698).

The Plaintiffs filed no opposing affidavits.

In his

affidavit the Appellant stated the following facts:
3. That prior to the trial in the above-entitled matter the
Defendant had tried earnestly and persistently to obtain
from UTAH MORTGAGE LOAN CORPORATION and the FEDERAL HOUSING
ADMINISTRATION information concerning the loan applications
of the Plaintiffs, which formed the basis of the Plaintiffs
claim against the Defendant. These attempts were made
through personal visits and phone calls to the offices of
the said loaning agencies respectively.
4. That the Defendant herein had consistently and
persistently been told by the said loaning agencies that the
files concerning the Plaintiffs had been destroyed and were
therefore not available.
5. That the Defendant conveyed this to his attorney of
record, and both the said Defendant and his attorney herein
relied upon statements of the said loaning agencies that the
files had been destroyed and that the information contained
in them was not available.
6. Based on this reliance and the absence of the evidence
contained in the files, the above-entitled court rendered
its decision against the Affiant herin.
7. On or about the 23rd of June, 1980, the Defendant was
advised by Utah Mortgage Loan Corporation that the
Plaintiff's file had been discovered and was not in fact
destroyed. Defendant obtained a copy of said file and from
the same found the following facts:
A. Plaintiffs made application to Utah Mortgage Loan
Corporation on April 25, 1977 for a $29,000.00 loan at
8% interest per annum for 30 years.
B. Said loan to be secured by Lien on 275 Gemini
Drive.
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C. The application was made for the purpose of
obtaining an F.ri.A. Section 203(b) Insured Loan.
D. This loan was not used by Plaintiffs, since they
had made downpayment on another property.
8. After the cancellation of this loan the Plaintiffs then
obtained a loan from American Home Mortgage and/or Medallion
Mortgage Company which was an F.H.A. 235 subsidized loan
using one of Marsden Corporation's reservations, therefore,
this reduced the interest rate of the loan to 4%. This
effectively made the present value of the second loan, which
plaintiffs accepted, better than the present value of the
first loan, which they rejected, even though the total
purchase price was greater.
9. In effect by accepting the second loan the Plaintiffs
obtained a less expensive loan and were not damaged thereby.
10. Defendant also found from the Utah Mortgage Loan
Corporation file that there was a substantial amount less
consideration to the Plaintiffs with April 1977 Earnest
Money Agreement/Utah Mortgage Loan Corporation loan
application than with final Earnest Money Agreement/loan
application.
11. The Plaintiffs were bettered financially by the final
Earnest Money Agreement.
In its motion for the new trial the Appellant claimed that
it was made pursuant to subsections 1, 2, 6 and 7 of Rule 60(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R-82).
At the time of the hearing Defendant requested to put on
evidence (R-472); but the trial court instructed only a protfer,
to which the Plaintiffs did not object (R-473).
profter the Defendant submitted the following:
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Under the

1.

The evidence would show that the record loan that

Plaintiffs obtained and purchased the house with was in fact
cheaper than the first loan that was obtained (R-473).
2.

That the first loan obtained was for 8% interest and the

record for 4% interest.

Therefore the second loan even

though it was for approximately $7 r 500 more was a cheaper
loan for Plaintiffs (R-474).
3.

That Defendant obtained the cheaper loan for the

Plaintiffs and it was a 235 F.H.A. loan (R-474).
4.

That the evidence showed that Plaintiffs had in fact

withdrawn their application for the first loan and were not
awarded it (R-474).
5.

That the Plaintiffs suffered no damage by using the

second loan at 4% as opposed to the first at 8% (R-476).
6.

That Plaintiffs ended up with a better house, with more

extras in it at a cheaper price

(R-476-477).

In its order denying the Defendant's motion the trial court
never stated why it had made its decision
Rule 6Q(D)(2)

(R-461-462).

In applying the above facts to the applicable

language of the Rule we find that there was in fact "newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b)."
Appellants affidavit (R-96-98) clearly indicates that the
-24-

respective loaning institutions told him they had been
destroyed.

At the trial the Plaintiffs, when asked, could not

state that they had documents (R-43) or knew the terms and
conditions of the first loan (R-53) and therefore the only place
to get the correct information was at the loaning institutions.
When this information was obtained, it clearly showed the
difference between the two loans and the fact that the second
loan was financially advantageous to the Plaintiffs and they
suffered no damages thereby.

Appellants submit that under the

language of Rule 60(b) the trial court should have allowed a new
trial based upon newly discovered evidence.
Rule 60(b)(1)

The record also shows that the Appellant

represented himself in nearly all of the discovery processes
(R-13; R-33; R-38; R25-28) and only retained counsel fourteen
days before trial (R-43), thus not allowing sufficient time in
which to allow discovery.

This was done through the Defendant's

lack of knowledge of the legal system, misunderstanding of the
laws of this state and represents inadvertence and/or exccusable
neglect.

This prevented the Appellant from timely retaining

counsel and thus avoiding procedural difficulties.

As this Court

held in Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co. 260 P.2d 741, 123 U 416.
The allowance of a vacation of a judgement is a
creature of equity designed to relieve against harshness of
enforcing a judgment, which may occur through procedural
-25-

difficulties, the wrongs of the opposing party, or
misfortunes which prevent the presentation of a claim or
defense.
Where the newly discovered shows that the Plaintiffs have
not in fact been damaged, the harshness of the $9,350.00
judgement is apparent.
Rule 60(b) 6 & 7

The Appellant submits that the judgement

is unjust upon its face in that the Plaintiffs received what they
bargained for (exhibit 3-P) and that the newly discovered
evidence proves the inequity of the trial courts decision.

The

facts before the trial court on the motion indicate clearly that
the Plaintiffs received a better home, a cheaper loan, and
therefore were not damaged (R-96-98; R-473; 474; 476; 477)
Therefore, on the basis of equity, it is now unjust to enforce a
judgement of $9,350.00 which is now not merited.

The trial court

should have granted Defendant's motion, allowed the new evidence
in and then made its decision as to damages.
Conclusion
Based upon the forgoing, the Appellant, Roger Marsden,
respectfully requests that the judgement of the trial court be
vacated and a new trial be ordered and that the order of the
trial court denying Defendant's motion under Rule 60(b) be
reversed and the case remanded for trial.
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Respectfully submitted,
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PATRICK L. and SHARON K.
GERRARD,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.

6-3. - *

ROGER J. P. and MYRNA E.
MARSDEN,
Defendants.

S

-'*„,u,

Civil No. C-79-2873

This action came on for trial before the court, the
Honorable J. E. Banks presiding, and the having been duly
tried and the judge having previously entered his Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is therefore
ORDERED, JUDGED AND DECREED that the plaintiffs are
entitled to specific performance of the April 26, 1977, earnest
money.

It is further ordered, judged, and decreed that the

defendant Roger J. P. Marsden shall pay the plaintiffs the
sum of $7,850.00.
It is further ordered and adjudged that the plaintiffs
recover of the defendant the sum of $9,350.00 with interest
thereon at the rate of 8% per annum as provided by law and
their costs of action incurred herein.
DATED this

jg

day of May, 1980.
BY THE COURT

^J0^ £ /Q*+>/>i-
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(b) Mistakes; Inadvertenoe; Excusable Heglect; Mewly Discovered
Bvidenoe; Fraud, Etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for
any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally served upon
the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed
to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application;
or (7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for
reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than three months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this
subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its
operation. This Rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain
an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as
prescribed in these Rules or by an independent action.
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aLCL^JL
Proposed Loan Amount %J^^Jt^r€'
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&#-%

t *° *>* secured by first lien on property

<£ ^(nti«*U-mmAJ£L

FHA Loan
VA Loan
.Conventional Loan

for
for
for

77

19

_ _ •
x# n

yra.
yrs.
yrs.

Interest rate
Interest rate
Interest rate

Principal and Interest
Hazard Insurance (Fire/Flood)
*«*«•
PMI or FHA Insurance
Other
TOTAL ESTIMATED MONTHLY PAYMENT

$
$
$
$
$
$

y

X
X
I

^?A£% & t*
7.+-o
^fL.SL^
jfr.Q ^ ir
^ A *. *-«*

ADVANCE DISCLOSURE OF SETTLEMENT COSTS
This list gives an estimate of most of the charges you will have to pay at the
settlement of your loan. The figures shown, aa estimates, are subject to change
The figures shown are computed based on the aalea price and proposed mortgage f
amount stated in your application.
•" ^
901 Loan Origination Fee . . . . . . . . . .
$
**?<?/). *-0
$02 f Loan Discount. • • . <<JL<LJLA**~* . M.Yi

$

803
804
805
808
810
901

$
$
$
.$
$

902
1101
1105
1109
1201
1301

Appralaal Fee
Credit Report
Lenders Inspection Fee
Tax Service.
..•
FNMA Processing Fee
Interest (The maximum you could be required to
nay based on your application) . . .
Mortgage Insurance Ptemfum •
Settlement or Closing Fee
Document Preparation Fee . . . . •JLLAJLH*
..
Title Insurance
Recording Feci*
Survey
Other:
First year's hazard insurance premium
Hazard insurance reserve ( /2b mos)
Property tax reserve ( A . mos)
FHA or PMI insurance reserve ( / mos)

jp^+ji*jsro

*~~—

^*~*. +-o
/.^i^-o

"*

^
**.$ ^/y.^.*rj*y
$
$
.S
^^r.—A
$
/A / o-O
•$
~f*. o~Q
5
$
$
$
S

1

*
*-—T
_

f+4.trG
£*. f|< «i ** yx/ **
-*na.0~e>
Ji,.<?^

$ *& * 9f,

TOTAL ESTIMATED C LOS INC COSTS

«*
;..
A
'?]

7 2L

THIS FORM MAY NOT COVER AIX ITEMS YOU WILL BE REQUIRED TO PAY IN CASH AT SETTLEMENT.
YOU MAY WISH TO INQUIRE AS TO THE AMOUNTS OF SUCH OTHER ITEMS. YOU MAY BE REQUIRED
TO PAY OTHER ADDITIONAL AMOUNTS AT SETTLEMENT.
tA.m.jrO

ESTIMATED DISCOUNT POINTS TO BE PAID BY SELLER (?$)* $

M,*+~'

•

Received a copy of the foregoing estimated settlement c o s t s , and the b o o k l e t , ' ; ^ ;
"Your Culde to Settlement Costs" t h i s _n £3tL day of
ftfj*D
.
, 19 7 7 »£;

Applicant

Applicant
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Thorn D. Roberts - #2773 of
ROBERTS & ROBERTS
Attorney f o r P l a i n t i f f s
10 West 300 South, S u i t e 400
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84101
Telephone:
(801) 363-3550

,st Court

Otou'v C>*-v

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH
PATRICK L. and SHARON K.
GERRARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ROGER J . P. AND MYRNA E.
MARSDEN,
Defendants.

)
)

ORDER DENYING MOTION
POR NEW TRIAL

)
)
)
)

C i v i l No.
Judge

C79-2873

Jay E. Banks

)

The a b o v e - e n t i t l e d matter having come b e f o r e t h e a b o v e e n t i t l e d Court, t h e Honorable Jay E.Banks p r e s i d i n g , and Defendant
Roger J . P. Marsden's Motion f o r a New T r i a l under Rule 60(b) of
t h e Utah Rules of C i v i l Procedure, and t h e Court having heard t h e
arguments of c o u n s e l , and reviewed t h e matter submitted t h e r e t o ,
and b e i n g f u l l y a d v i s e d in t h e p r e m i s e s , i t i s hereby
ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED t h a t the D e f e n d a n t ' s

Motion for a New Trial shall be and the same is hereby denied
DATED this

^ ^ d a y of Jtti?', 1985.
BY THE COURT:

f &*~*^

JUDgt #sy E. BANKS
District Court Judge

ATTEST

Approved as to form:

H. DIXON HINDLEY
Clerk

Puffin

VGRAHAM DODD

Deputy Clark

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER DENYING NOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL was mailed,
postage prepaid, on this

day of

July, 1985, to the following:

Mr. Graham Dodd
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell
Attorneys for Defendants
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

2?2»*ji~.

<2 /?S/>M _^

o
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Graham Dodd
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorney for Defendant
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 521-3680

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PATRICK L. GERRARD,
Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE
AND/OR ENTRY

vs.
ROGER J. P. MARSDEN,

Civil No. C 79-2873

Defendant.

COMES NOW Graham Dodd, and notifies the above entitled
Court that he has been retained to represent the Defendants herein
and therefore notifies the Court of his appearance for and in
behalf of the Defendants.
DATED on this

/*T

day of April, 1980.

^iOBraham Dodd
Attorney for Defendant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Notice of Appearance and/or Entry was mailed to Thorn
Roberts, Attorney for Plaintiffs, 10 West Broadway, Salt Lake
sCk
City, Utah 84111, on this the
day of A p r i l , 1 9 8 0 .

/9

KIRTON A McCONKIE
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
330 S THIRD EAST
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH

03

~H

\H.

GRAHAM DODD
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys at Law

330 South Third

East

Salt Lake City, Utah
Telephone: 521-3680

84111

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PATRICK L. and SHARON K.
GERRARD,
Plaintiffs,

AFFIDAVIT OF
ROGER J. P. MARSDEN

vs.

IN SUPPORT OF MOTION

ROGER J. P. and MYRNA E.
MARSDEN,

FOR NEW TRIAL.

Defendents.

Civil No. C-79-2873

COMES NOW the Defendant above-named ROGER J. P. MARSDEN,
and for purpose of making this Affidavit part of the record of
the above-entitled case, states and deposes under oath as follows:
1.

That he is one of the Defendants in the above-

entitled matter.
2.

That a final judgment was entered against him on

the 3rd day of June,
3.

1980, in the above-entitled matter.

That prior to the trial in the above-entitled matter

the Defendant had tried earnestly and persistently to obtain from
UTAH MORTGAGE LOAN CORPORATION and the FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION

information concerning the loan applications of the

Plaintiffs, which formed the basis of the Plaintiffs claim against
the Defendant.

These attempts were made through personal visits

and phone calls to the offices of the said loaning agencies
respectively.
4.

That the Defendant herein had consistently and

persistently been told by the said loaning agencies

that the

files concerning the Plaintiffs had been destroyed and were
KIRTOM ft McCONKIE

therefore not available.

i

5.

That the Defendant

conveyed this to his attorney of

record, and both the said Defendant and his attorney herein relied
upon statements of the said loaning agencies that the files had
been destroyed and that the information contained in them was not
available.
6.

Based on this reliance and the absence of the

evidence contained in the files, the above-entitled court rendered
its decision against the Affiant herein.
7.

On or about the 23rd of June, 1980, the Defendant

was advised by Utah Mortgage Loan Corporation that the Plaintiff's
file had been discovered and was not in fact destroyed.
Defendant obtained a copy of said file and from the same found the
following facts:
A.

Plaintiffs made application to Utah Mortgage

Loan Corporation on April 25, 1977 for a $29,000.00
loan at 8% interest per annum for 30 years.
B.

Said loan to be secured by Lien on 275 Gemini

Drive.
C.

The application was made for the purpose of

obtaining an F.H.A. Section 203(b) Insured Loan.
D.

This loan was not used by Plaintiffs, since

they had made downpayment
8.

on another property.

After the cancellation of this loan the

Plaintiffs then obtained a loan from American Home Mortgage and/or
Medallion Mortgage Company which was an F.H.A. 235 subsidized
loan using one of Marsden Corporation's reservations, therefore,
this reduced the interest rate of the loan to 4%.

This

effectively made the present value of the second loan, which
Plaintiffs accepted, better than the present value of the first
loan, which they rejected, even though the total purchase price
was greater.

-2-

97

10.

In effect by accepting the second loan the

Plaintiffs obtained a less expensive loan and were not damaged
thereby.
11.

Defendant also found from the Utah Mortgage Loan

Corporation file that there was a substantial amount less consideration to the Plaintiffs with April 1977 Earnest Money Agreement/
Utah Mortgage Loan Corporation loan application than with final
Earnest Money Agreement/loan application.
12.

The Plaintiffs were bettered financially by the

final Earnest Money Agreement.
Further, your Affiant saith not.
DATED on this the JL&

day of

^

4

^

^

ROGER J.'T. M/
MARSDEN

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to me this the £b

^ZciCd^lt
<7

, 1980.

My commission expires:

J^L

KIRTON ft McCONKIE |
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
fan c Tuion C A C T

}J*

VOTARY P U B L I C . ^
Residing a t :

5*

day of

, 1980

M'
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County, Utah

JUN

Thorn D. Roberts, of
ROBERTS, BLACK & DIBBLEE
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
10 West 300 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 363-3550

51960

W. Stating Evsns. Clerk 3rd Oitt Court
By.

f>e*Jty C!*cK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PATRICK L. and SHARON K.
GERRARD,

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
vs.
ROGER J. P. and MYRNA E.
MARSDEN,
Defendants.

Civil No. C-79-2873

The above entitled matter, having come on regularly
for trial on the 28th day of April, 1980, the plaintiffs
appearing in person and through their counsel, Thorn D. Roberts,
and the defendant Roger J. P. Marsden appearing personally
and through counsel, Graham Dodd, and the parties having
presented evidence and the Court, being fully advised in the
premises and previously having surveyed the Plaintiff's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and argument
having been heard on Defendant's Motion Objecting to Findings
of Fact and to Modify, the Court hereby makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That the plaintiffs and defendant were residents

of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and that the cause of
action was with regard to a piece of real property located in
Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

The defendant Roger J. P. Marsden was one of

the joint owners and was the builder of a house located at
275 North Gemini Drive, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County,
State of Utah.

RDICRTS I U C K * DlSSLEE
ATTD«Nl¥S
I U I T I 4SO

AT LAW

T C * •NOAOWA-r • U ' i . O ' M a

: 0
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3.

That the defendant Myrna E. Marsden previous to

the date of the trial filed a chapter 13 proceeding in Bankruptcy
Court and this action proceeded to trial only as against
defendant Roger J. P. Marsden.
4.

That on or about April 26, 1977, the plaintiffs

offered to purchase the house and property located at 275
Gemini Drive from the defendant, Roger J. P. Marsden.
5.

That Mr. Richard B. Lauritzen of Lauritzen and

Associates undertook to sell the property of the Defendant
Roger J. P. Marsden which had been previously listed at a
Century 21 office and thereby became the Defendant Roger J. P.
Marsden's agent and real estate agent for this transaction.
6.

That on April 26, 1977, the defendant clarified

the offer of the plaintiffs and directed his agent to return
it to the plaintiffs.
7.

That the clarification by the defendant Roger J. P.

Marsden contained no additional material requirements of the
plaintiffs such as to constitute a counteroffer.
8.

That the condition of tentative approval in

writing by the bank as contained in the earnest money dated
April 26, 1977, was told to the defendant Roger J. P. Masden
to be impossible by Mr. Lauritzen and was impossible under
the circumstances of this case and the defendant Roger J. P.
Marsden then directed Mr. Lauritzen to deliver the agreement
to the plaintiffs.
9.

That the defendant fraudulently listed himself

individually as the seller of the property and so informed
his agent, Mr. Lauritzen.
10.

That the plaintiffs relied on said representations

as the seller throughout the entire transaction.
11.

That the plaintiffs immediately agreed to the

clarification of the defendant and did all things required
under the contract as expressed by the earnest money, the
defendant and his agent, there being no additional burden or

f
ROBERTS

BLACK & D l B B L E E

^
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requirements of the Plaintiffs, the plaintiffs were not
required to immediately sign said earnest money.
12.

That the defendant prior to May 3, 1977, actively

worked with Utah Mortgage Loan Company with whom plaintiffs
were required to make loan application with regard to processing
plaintiff's loan application and.the appraisal on the property
and by his actions delayed the approval of the loan by the
bank to the plaintiffs.
13.

That at all times the plaintiffs were ready,

willing and able to comply with the terms and conditions of
the contract and the earnest money as expressed by the defendant.
14.

That the Plaintiffs used all due and diligent

efforts to effectuate the terms and conditions of the agreement.
15.

That the defendant breached the earnest money

agreement by failing to complete the construction and deliver
the premises to the plaintiffs on June 1, 1977.
16.

That the defendant breached the earnest money

agreement by failing to convey good title and finish construction
after the final approval of the plaintiffs' loan at Utah
Mortgage Loan Company in November 1977.
17.

That the defendant continually failed and

refused to go through with the closing of the sale of the
premises and the completion of the construction of the house
at the premises.
18.

That from May 15 through November 1977 the

defendant Roger J. P. Marsden continually stated that he
would complete construction on the building within a short
period of time and at that time close on the sale of the
premises and that the plaintiffs reasonably relied upon said
representations and failed to take additional legal action.
19.

That from May 1977 through March 1978 plaintiffs

with the knowledge and approval of the defendant Roger J. P.
Marsden purchased various items of personal property for the
premises, installed some of those items in the premises and
did substantial work on the premises' construction to help
effectuate the completion of construction.
R O B E R T S BLACK * D I B B L E E
-ATTOHNCYt AT LAW

*****
/ -
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20.

That the purchase price of the earnest money

agreement dated April 26, 1977, was in the amount of $31,352.00.
21.

That the defendants conveyed the premises to

the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs took possession of the
premises on July 1, 1978.
22.

That the purchase price of the premises was

set at $39,200.00 by earnest money dated June 3, 1978, which
amount has been fully paid for by the plaintiffs.
23.

That there was no new consideration to support

any additional terms in the second earnest money.
24.

That the plaintiffs were required to obtain

services of an attorney and a reasonable amount as and for
attorney's fees for the handling of this case is $1,500.00
25.

That this judgment is against Roger J. P.

Marsden only; however, there is no just reason for delay and
that the judgment entered in this case should be final upon
entry as to this defendant.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court hereby
makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the eaernest money agreement dated April

26, 1977, is a valid and binding contract between the plaintiffs
and the defendants.
2.
fraud in the

That the defendant Roger J. P. Marsden committed
execution of the contrct and in the operation

under its terms.
3.

That the plaintiffs are entitled to specific

performance of the April 26, 1977, earnest money and the
defendant Roger J. P. Marsden should be ordered to pay the
difference in purchase price between the earnest money of
April 26, 1977, and the final purchase price of $39,200.00.
4.

That the plaintiffs have been damaged by the

breach of the earnest money and the fraud of the defendant
Roger J. P. Marsden in the amount of $7,850.00 and are entitled
to damages in said amount.

ROBERTS SLACK * DIBBLEE

-5-

5.

That the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment in

the amount of $1,500.00 as and for attorney's fees.
6.

That any judgment entered in this case against

Roger J. P. Marsden shall be a final judgment pursuant to
rule 54(b).
BY THE COURT

ATTEST
' .

CcERK

f^j

S J?

*

District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of
the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was
mailed to Graham Dodd, Attorney for Defendant, 330 South 300
East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this

day of June,

1980.

THOM D. ROBERTS
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that 4 true and correct copies of the
foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF were mailed to Respondents by
depositing them in the United States Mail on this
Decemberf 1985, to the following counsel of record:
Thorn D. Roberts
ROBERTS & ROBERTS
10 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah

84101

day of

